Now that we know where the Blazers stand picks wise, I thought it’d be a good time to look into where guys are currently projected to go. Just looking at a couple of mainstream mock drafts simply won’t suffice, so I took it a step further….

The mock drafts I used came from here. Some are more reputable and well sourced than others but most of those I used were important enough to their creators that they updated them yesterday following the draft lottery. For this exercise, whether they were completed pre-lottery or post-lottery doesn’t matter so much, as the purpose is to get an idea of which part of the draft guys are slated in rather than which team they’ll end up on. Given the complete lack of movement outside of the top four this year, it’s unlikely anyone shifts more than a couple of spots based on the results of the lottery.

For those that care/are interested in reading a bunch of mock drafts (some interesting, others amusing), these are the 15 I used:

DraftExpress

ESPN 

NBADraft.net

CBS (both)

WalterFootball

HoopsWorld

The Hoops Report

NBA Draft Room

My NBA Draft

Pro Basketball Draft

Hoops Addict

NBA-Draft

Real Sports Hype

HoopStuff

The Results

The basic idea was to create a consensus mock drafter’s mock draft. The easiest way to do that was just to tabulate all the varied picks for each first round prospect and average them out. This is what the spreadsheet spat out:
 

1. Anthony Davis | PF/C | 19 | 6’10 | 220lbs | Kentucky | Average Position – 1 |

2. Michael Kidd-Gilchrist | SF | 18 | 6’7 | 230lbs | Kentucky | Average Position – 2.7 |

3. Bradley Beal | SG | 18 |  6’4 | 200lbs | Florida | Average Position – 3.7 |

4. Thomas Robinson | PF | 21 | 6’9 | 240lbs | Kansas | Average Position – 4.1 |

5. Andre Drummond | C | 18 | 6’11 | 268lbs | Connecticut | Average Position – 4.7 |

6. Harrison Barnes | SF | 20 | 6’8 | 225lbs | North Carolina | Average Position – 5 |

7. Jared Sullinger | C/PF | 20 | 6’9 | 280lbs | Ohio State | Average Position – 9.5 |

8. Perry Jones III | SF/PF | 20 | 6’11 | 220lbs | Baylor | Average Position – 9.5 |

9. Damian Lillard | PG/SG | 21 | 6’2 | 185lbs | Weber State | Average Position – 9.6 |

10. Jeremy Lamb | SG | 20 | 6’5 | 185lbs | Connecticut | Average Position – 10.7 |

11. Tyler Zeller | C | 22 | 7’0 | 250lbs | North Carolina | Average Position – 11.8 |

12. Kendall Marshall | PG | 20 | 6’4 | 200lbs | North Carolina | Average Position – 12.8 |

13. John Henson | PF | 21 | 6’11 | 220lbs | North Carolina | Average Position – 12.9 |

14. Dion Waiters | SG/PG | 20 | 6’4 | 210lbs | Syracuse | Average Position – 15.5 |

15. Austin Rivers | SG/PG | 19 | 6’4 | 200lbs | Duke | Average Position – 15.5 |

16. Arnett Moultrie | PF/C | 21 | 6’11 | 220lbs | Mississippi State | Average Position – 15.6 |

17. Terrence Jones | PF/SF | 20 | 6’9 | 250lbs | Kentucky | Average Position – 15.8 |

18. Meyers Leonard | C | 20 | 7’1 | 240lbs | Illinois | Average Position – 16.5 |

19. Terrence Ross | SG/SF | 21 | 6’7 | 200lbs | Washington | Average Position – 16.9 |

20. Quincy Miller | SF | 19 | 6’9 | 200lbs | Baylor | Average Position – 20.2 |

21. Moe Harkless | SF | 19 | 6’8 | 210lbs | St. John’s | Average Position – 22 |

22. Marquis Teague | PG | 19 | 6’2 | 180lbs | Kentucky | Average Position – 23 |

23. Fab Melo | C | 21 | 7’0 | 250lbs | Syracuse | Average Position – 23.1 |

24. Tony Wroten | PG/SG | 19 | 6’5 | 180lbs | Washington | Average Position – 24.5 |

25. Jeff Taylor | SF | 23 | 6’7 | 225lbs | Vanderbilt | Average Position – 24.7 |

26. Royce White | PF | 21 | 6’8 | 270lbs | Iowa State | Average Position – 24.9 |

27. Andrew Nicholson | PF/C | 22 | 6’9 | 220lbs | St. Bonaventure | Average Position – 25.9 |

28. Festus Ezeli | C | 21 | 6’11 | 255lbs | Vanderbilt | Average Position – 26.2 |

29. Doron Lamb | SG | 20 | 6’4 | 170lbs | Kentucky | Average Position – 26.2 |

30. Evan Fournier | SG/SF | 19 | 6’7 | 205lbs | Poitiers | Average Position – 26.5 |
 

In addition to a simple mean average of where all the different mock drafts had guys slotted, I looked at the median and mode too in order to see what sort of variance there would be in the results.

The order created using median results didn’t vary a ton from the above. Meyers Leonard and Doron Lamb moved up the most, both jumping three spots, while Dion Waiters was the big loser, falling from 14th to 18th.

Looking at the mode results, there was again only limited movement. John Henson moved up three spots to the tenth slot, reflecting the fact that mock drafts were quite split on him – many seeing him as a top ten pick and quite a few others projecting him outside the lottery. Meyers again jumped, moving from 18 to 14, for reasons similar to Henson. Moe Harkless lost out more than any other in this analysis, dropping from 21 to 24.

Looking at a combination of the three methods, you can come away with a pretty decent idea of what range prospects are starting out this process in. If we separate it into some basic catagories; top 5, top 10, lottery, top 20 and late first, guys group together fairly neatly.

Top 5 – Davis, Kidd-Gilchrist, Robinson, Beal, Drummond

Top 10 – Barnes, Sullinger, P. Jones, Lillard, J. Lamb

Lottery – Marshall, Zeller, Henson, Rivers

Top 20 – Leonard, Moultrie, T. Jones, Waiters, Ross, Miller

Late First – Harkless, Teague, Melo, Wroten, Taylor, Fournier, White, Nicholson, Ezeli, D. Lamb
 

The fact that we get to choose whichever we want of the guys in the top 10 and lottery groups is something we should be pretty stoked about. Things will likely shift some over the next month but even given that, we have something to look forward too! I’m holding on to  that.

We might quibble over which style of player we’d like, how much we should consider fit, production vs upside and whatever else but there are some damn good prospects in both of those groups and only a couple look truly risky. Surely we can avoid those and at least hit a nice triple with the 6th pick and a solid double with the 11. Sure the walk-off grand slam is going to the New Orleans but we can get some positive momentum going with this draft. Heck, maybe we even hit a homer. To sum it up – keep the damn picks and make a run at something special, Blazers.

Chat = closed, enjoy regular comments for now!

Without knowing the draft order just yet it’s pretty nuts to speculate about who the Blazers are going to pick, so let’s look at some of the guys we know are going to be available: those already in the NBA. The Blazers have to target both a point guard and some frontcourt help this offseason, at the very least. The point guard crop is incredibly slim in the draft, which is why I’d look to address that need through free agency or a trade. Surprisingly there are some pretty decent options who are likely expendable by their teams. I’m only looking at players who might be available, are on the right side of their prime, and should be able to come in and start immediately with a modicum of competence. Since the roster is in such a state of flux, I also consider it a pro if the player can play off the ball should the Blazers acquire a star wing in the near future. All stats from 2011/12.

Goran Dragic, Houston Rockets, Unrestricted Free Agent

25 years old / 111 ORTG / 21.8 Usage / 32.5 (Pomeroy) Assist Pct / 18.0 PER

Dragic is pretty clearly the most desirable point guard on the market, and should command a contract just shy of what Mike Conley Jr. received, at
9 million a year. After being largely a scoring point in his Phoenix days, Dragic vastly improved his ability to run the offense and make plays for others this year, and his excellent assist rate was no fluke. He’s already an above average starting point guard who could come in and run the offense without much of a learning curve. Dragic should also be a good long-term fit as a role player since he has experience playing off the ball some in Phoenix with Nash and hits three pointers at above 36% for his career on high volume.  He also has good size and decent enough fundamentals to avoid being a defensive liability (though Houston was not a great defensive team, this was largely because of their lack of quality size).

The biggest concern for Dragic is that he’s due to slam into Plexiglas this season, since his 2011-12 numbers show huge improvements over any previous year. Given the keys to the offense though, there’s no reason he can’t be a very good starter at the point guard position for the Blazers. And though the price would be fairly high, at his age he’s unlikely to get worse and should be worth the contract over the next four years. So long as people don’t get too frustrated when he inevitably goes from 18.0 PER to 16.5 PER, instead of improving by three points a season.

Pros: available (due to Lowry), young, productive, pure point guard, off-ball ability.

Cons: Likely expensive, likely to underperform his 2011/12 production next year.

Jerryd Bayless, Toronto Raptors, Restricted Free Agent

23 years old / 110 ORTG / 24.3 Usage / 30.7 Ast% / 17.7 PER

Of course any mention of Bayless will bring back dim memories of the Bayless debates, so I hesitate to bring him up. That said, for a guy that everybody says washed out, that line is pretty good. The caveat here is he did it all in less than 800 minutes. He’s still not a pure point guard, getting most of his assists in the drive and kick variety, but again the assist percentage is encouraging. You wouldn’t expect him to come in and run the offense as well as someone like Dragic. But he’s already flashed his upside as a scorer in his first Portland stint, and he’s now 38% from 3 over the past two seasons (91/236), so he may be able to play off-ball in the right situation. At 23, he also probably has more room for growth than anybody else on the market.

The flipside is that Jerryd remains something of a project at this point, and a project that two teams have now given up on. The Blazers would be taking a gamble that he’s capable of learning how to play the point, given the opportunity. Additionally, though his effort level on defense is excellent, his tools and discipline are poor and he still fouls too much for a guard.

Pros: Explosive scorer, room to improve, probably cheaper than similarly productive players, could remain productive either off-ball or in a sixth man role.

Cons: Defense, point guard skills, Blazer fan PTSD.

Ramon Sessions, LA Lakers, Early Termination Option for 2012/13

25 Years Old / 108 ORTG / 21.6 USG / 35.5 AST% / 16.7 PER

Sessions has been a long-time figure in the Blazer point guard debate, perpetually being a backup or a starter on a team looking for a better point guard. Though that appeared to change when he was traded to the Lakers at this year’s trade deadline, the whole situation went bad for him as his high pick and roll skills were a terrible fit for the Lakers’ other personnel. This culminated with a disastrous playoffs where he posted an 8.5 PER and was benched in favor of Steve Blake for important stretches. With the Lakers roster in flux, he may look for a way out, or may get traded should he decline to exercise his ETO.

As a player, Sessions is a decent distributor who is generally able to make the right read and safe pass out of the pick and roll (2:1 A:TO). He gets in the lane when there is a lane and is OK at finishing there. Sessions’ game can largely be described as “decent” or “OK,” aside from his defense which is rather terrible. He’s a polished pick and roll player who would be ready to run the offense, but would be unlikely to ever become a star player. He’s also not an ideal fit if the Blazers acquire a ball-dominant wing since he is at his best with the ball in his hands.

Pros: Polished, pure point guard, good passer, known quantity.

Cons: No room for improvement, can’t play off-ball, horrible defense.

George Hill, Indiana Pacers, Restricted Free Agent

25 Years Old / 117 ORTG / 17.2 Usage / 18.8 AST% / 15.7 PER

As is fairly clear from the numbers, Hill is a much different sort of player. He’s much closer to the shooting guard side of the “combo” spectrum, and prefers to look for his own shot or play off ball, here he’s effective because he’s a strong three point shooter (37.6% career). At the same time, these are exactly the qualities that make him available: Indiana is a team that does not pass well, and should probably look to make Collison (a better passer and more natural playmaker) its clear #1 while focusing its financial resources on improving its shallow frontcourt.

For the Blazers, Hill would have to play alongside a ball-dominant wing such as Iguodala where he and Batum’s spot-up shooting would be fully utilized. Should the Blazers acquire a more “pure” point in the future, Hill’s skillset easily allows him to back-up both guard positions as he did in San Antonio.

Pros: Defined skills, outside shot, ability to fit in as a role player.

Cons: Instant impact (?), not a pure point guard, little room for improvement.

Mike Conley Jr., Memphis Grizzlies, Under Contract

24 Years Old / 110 ORTG / 18.3 Usage / 29.8 AST% / 16.8 PER

After being ridiculed for signing Conley to a 5 year $45 million contract, the Memphis Grizzles were pleasantly surprised to see the guy they paid significantly above average money for begin to produce like a significantly above average point guard. He’s now just about worth the money. That said, the Grizzlies figure to be deep into the punitive luxury tax when it goes into effect, and will probably look to dump salary. While Rudy Gay should be the one they look to dump, he’s very expensive and not very good.

Conley is a solid point guard who’s comfortable with the ball in his hands and good from the outside. Though his production and efficiency aren’t eye popping, I’d be interested to see what he can do in an offense where he’s asked to shoulder a bit more of the load in pick and rolls instead of being the last option behind Randolph, Gay and Gasol. He’s certainly shown flashes of being able to handle that. Finally, he’s a good defender and one of the leading thieves in the game (3.5 Steal%).

Pros: Polished, can hit the 3, good passer, low turnovers, good defender, could assume more offensive responsibility?

Cons: Expensive (have to give up picks + pay him), scoring efficiency.

I think the first option here is clearly Dragic. He’s young, available, productive, and a pure point guard. If he’s not available or is too expensive, my choice would be to go after one of the combo guards (Hill or Bayless) and pair him with Iguodala. If Iguodala can’t be had, I’d still go for a combo guard and get a journeyman point like Ridnour to be his point guard “caddy” or sorts. These sorts of lineups can be fairly effective since the point of attack can change easily and confuse the defense. Additionally, teams pay a premium for pure points which is worthwhile in the case of Chris Paul, but not so much Sessions or Conley. So rather than go for a too-expensive guy in search of the point-guard Grail, I’ll take the value play for now and hope to smooth it out later.

Brandon Roy after winning the #1 overall pick in 2007 (Image Courtesy of blogs.thescore.com)

With the draft lottery just a bit over a week away, its time for us to do a brief preview of the lottery process and possible outcomes.

The Basics:

Date/Time: 5 PM, Wednesday, May 30, 2012.

TV: ESPN/ESPN3 online.

The Lottery Process:

On the day of the draft lottery, about an hour before the lottery results are broadcast the actual lottery is conducted.  The actual lottery is conducted backstage by the accounting firm Ernst and Young with representatives from each team present.  These representatives are forbidden from communicating the results with anyone until after they are aired.

14 lottery balls are used for this draw, and the order in which they are drawn does not matter. This creates 1,001 possible outcomes, one of which is kept as an empty set and the other 1,000 are assigned to teams.  Each team receives a set number of winning combinations based on their record, the detailed odds chart for this year’s lottery is below (courtesy of the Cleveland Plain Dealer):

Notes:

x-New Jersey pick transferred to Portland if not in top 3.

y-GS pick transferred to Utah if not in top 7.

z-New Orleans receives this pick from Minnesota via the Clippers.

Here is the process, step by step:

1. 14 lottery balls, numbered 1-14, are placed in a standard lottery machine.
2. The balls are allowed to circulate for 20 seconds before the first ball is drawn, the next three balls are drawn at 10 second intervals.
3. Lottery officials check to see who owns the resulting combination, if it is not the empty set the owner of that combination receives the #1 overall pick.
4. The process is repeated twice more for the #2 and #3 picks.  If a team which has already won a pick gets one of its combinations drawn (or the empty set), the process is repeated until three distinct winners are found.  The exception to this is for the Hornets, who can win two of the top 3 picks IF one of their combinations from their pick AND one from the pick they got from Minnesota come up.
5. The remainder of the lottery teams are ordered in the reverse of their record, with the worst team that didn’t win a pick getting the fourth selection, the second worst fifth and so on.

So grab your lucky token, whatever it is, and hope that the Blazers can beat the odds to get a top 3 pick while NJ stays out of the top 3.

This doesn’t deal with the possibility of a sign and trade, which I would be in favor of exploring but may involve too many moving parts to be feasible.

I have frequently been intensely critical of Nicolas Batum since his semi-breakout in the Spring of 2010. I don’t appreciate his willingness to get lost in the shuffle on offense despite his immense skills or the lapses in intensity or concentration on the defensive end. I also am skeptical of the argument that he’s been held back in his time in Portland by Nate McMillan’s rudimentary offense or poor guard play. Though those things will affect any player, there’s just not a lot of evidence that they are affecting Batum, whose impact on a game is more determined by his own level of interest than anything else.

That said, even as it stands Nicolas is a very good offensive player, both for his ability to knock down 3s at a high efficiency and high volume, and for his fluid athleticism which has helped him become better and better at finishing at the rim and getting to the line. His free throw rate has grown each year in the league, indicating even more potential for improvement in that area as he’s asked to take a greater load.

On the defensive end, Batum’s reputation as a stopper you can count on has waned after that initial impression was somewhat debunked by counterpart statistics, and observers began noting his inconsistent effort on that side of the ball. That said, he has yet to play for a coach that truly demands A+ effort from defenders. Put in the correct scheme with a strong motivator and I would expect him to be more consistent. Additionally his defensive counting stats are good. So factoring in blocks and steals Batum is probably at least an average defender despite the consistency problems.

Adding to his value, Batum plays a premium position. The conventional wisdom is that point guards and big men are more desirable than wings right now. That’s just not the case. This is verifiable by looking at something simple like PER, where Nic’s 17.3 mark makes him the 8th best small forward but there are 22 point guards with a better mark. Anecdotally it’s also easy to see that at least 1/2 the teams in the league need a good two-way wing, while probably less than five have an immediate need at the point guard position. So Nic’s skill-set is relatively rare and valuable. Just how valuable?

The slippery concept of value

Whenever Nicolas Batum’s contract comes up we usually get a list of comparables, which are players who play his position and are similarly productive: Andre Iguodala, Rudy Gay, Luol Deng, and Danilo Gallinari being the most common. Those guys have contracts that average between 10 and 15 million dollars a year. A preference for any of those guys over Batum is a pretty close call, and he is clearly superior to players on slightly less lucrative contracts ( Charlie Villanueva (5/37.7), Marvin Williams (5/37.5), Andray Blatche (5/35.7) and Trevor Ariza (5/34) Wilson Chander, (5/35)).

It is tempting to call all of these players overpaid. But really the fact of the matter is non-rookie players are just overpaid on aggregate. So these numbers start to look kind of gnarly. But that’s going to be the case for every non-rookie or non-superstar max level contract, unless the player makes massive improvements over the course of the deal like LaMarcus Aldridge did. So teams should value their draft picks, but also have to recognize that to put together a basketball team you have to play in the “overpaid” pool of non-rookies and non-superstars.

More Seagull than Albatross

Educated observers are wise to note the importance of not overspending on role players (or even stars) as this can hamstring a team’s flexibility and force an owner to spend through the nose for an overly expensive team. That said, I don’t really see Batum’s contract becoming an albatross. He is young, the new limits on offer sheets will help, and it’s hard to think of a reasonable scenario where even a 12 million dollar contract will hamstring the Blazers. Even if the Blazers do happen upon superstars in the draft, Batum is essentially a Cadillac role player who would snap in beautifully next to a few budding stars.

As Kevin Pelton points out, it’s not the rate of extensions that kill teams, it’s the length. It is very hard to project how good a player will be in 5 years. Two of the most infamous contracts of the last CBA were Rashard Lewis and Gilbert Arenas, who basically became non-contributors in the last two years of massive contracts. Pelton’s study points out that production is generally a fairly decent value for the first three years, then tends to drop off a cliff. As such, in matching a big offer sheet for Batum, the Blazers will be taking a calculated gamble on a year of dead weight on the end of the contract. That’s a much better bet than a 5 or 6 year contract, where 40-50% of the contract is so far out it is difficult to project.

Further mitigating the risk is Batum’s age. Many of the players who become dead weight toward the end of their contract are signing their third or fourth contracts. That means the teams are just incorrectly pricing the decline of aging players. Even if Batum has stopped developing, he’s unlikely to decline during the years that generally constitute the first part of a player’s prime. So even under a fairly spendy extension, I’d say it’s fairly likely he will continue producing at a high level such that he remains in the echelon of other players earning similar money.

The next issue is the argument for flexibility necessarily requires a plausible alternative for the cap space Batum is about to occupy. Currently, the Blazers have just $31 million under contract next year. That means even after signing Batum to a $12 million dollar contract they would still have nearly enough money to throw at a maximum dollar free agent.

It is hard to imagine what Portland is going to do with all that money that is a more efficient use of it than signing Nic. Taking on a player like Andre Iguodala is somewhat better than Batum, but also carries a larger price tag and would require giving up an additional asset. He would also need a contract extension after next season (assuming he opts out) which would require a long-term commitment locking Portland into the tail end of his prime. Other free agents would also likely be coming off their second contract, and also at a greater risk than Batum to tail off during the extension. When we look at the free-agent pool and possibly available trades, there aren’t too many that avoid this trap (and there aren’t even that many good players in the free agent pool this summer).

Another possibility is simply to sign a series of bloated one-year contracts and continue rolling over the cap flexibility. But in the real world, players of Batum’s caliber or better rarely move in free agency or through trades for nothing more than capspace. To the extent that they do, they are either perceived to be damaged goods (Zach Randolph) or too old and expensive to justify the money (Carlos Boozer). I am all for gambling on the next Zach Randolph, but doesn’t holding over $25 million in capspace seem a bit excessive? Basically we’d be doing “rent-a-team” for four years in hopes of getting two Zach Randolphs!

Serendipity

The other issue alluded to above is that a long “albatross” of a contract can interfere with a team as it tries to change directions. The Sixers, for example, are somewhat hamstrung by Elton Brand’s bloated extension, while the Blazers were very fortunate to have the amnesty provision which keeps Brandon Roy’s deal from being an obstacle. But based on his youth, the relatively short-term nature of any impending offer sheet, and his qualities as a player, Batum is far more likely to be an asset on the court rather than a toxic bit of the ledger.

One of the recent columns of my latest writing spree related to why it’s good to stay decent instead of totally bottoming out. In that piece I outlined why I belive it’s easier to retain as many good players as possible, then be prepared to be a contender should you luck into a championship piece. Batum is a perfect guy to keep around in this sort of strategy. Should the Blazers hit the jackpot on the trade market or with the ping-pong balls, Batum will be a perfect complementary piece to stick alongside any star player.

To the extent that he will overpaid to be a complementary player, I can offer two responses. First, quality complementary two way wings are very rare as discussed above. Second, is it better to handsomely pay an excellent complementary player who can work with a ball-dominant star, or pay a guy who is a below-average “star” type like Rudy Gay who needs the ball to be effective but may not be good enough to be a first or second option on a team that wins anything? The answer for me isn’t clear but I would lean toward paying the complementary guy who defends and shoots. The star’s value will diminish if the team ever manages to make the moves necessary to win, while the complementary player’s value will increase.

By way of conclusion, I understand this isn’t a particularly strong or affirmative case for Batum being worth $12 million dollars. But the market for non-rookies and non-superstars is bloated not by the stupidity of NBA teams but by the rules of the CBA. So he will garner an eight-figure offer. Criticism of the market rate has to be accompanied with something more than blanket hand-waiving about him making too much (of course he makes too much, he’s a pro athlete!). It has to be shown that the market provides other and better options.

Size is a subject of much scrutiny in the NBA. It seems to be something you just have or you don’t (or in some cases, you have too much of) and once you’re labelled as small, short or overweight, it’s hard to shake. Generally size refers just to a players height and weight, with other concepts such as length and athleticism often given near equal importance but defined using different parameters. One area in which size is considered particularly important is in the draft, as a tool to help understand which draft prospects can translate their college production to the NBA .

Having size is of such great importance to college players looking to enter the NBA because having above average or even just so-called prototypical size for your likely NBA position will often lead to concerns over production, character and skill being ignored or at least somewhat overlooked. On the flip side, being an undersized prospect often-times means that production slips into the background, mired in questions of whether what was done on-court in college will be translatable.

I love analysing the draft and am obsessed with the skill, production and physical tools nexus that forms the basis of a player’s standing as a prospect. As a result I thought I’d investigate what prototypical size in the NBA really is by breaking down average height and weight by position, what was most common and what range existed. I originally did this just to have my own reference for this and future drafts but I thought I’d share, for anyone who shares my particular fascination.

I looked at the primary starter and backup across all NBA teams and broke down what I found both in basketball’s traditional five positions and by the growingly popular points, wings and bigs definition. I took injuries into account as well, for example using Varejao as Cleveland’s starting C rather than another player who stepped in to fill the gap. As a result there is some subjectivity to the players included but in reality it just avoided having temporary, out-of-position fill ins included over the usual starters. I used 82games’ production by position charts to decide on the location of any player who could be considered positionally ambiguous.

Point Guards

Starters

Average Height: 6’2″
Most Common Height: 6’3″
Shortest: 5’9″ (Isaiah Thomas)
Tallest: 6’4″ (Several)
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 189 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 180-185lbs
Lightest: 160lbs (Darren Collison)
Heaviest: ∞ (Raymond Felton)
Range: 51lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’2.25″
Most Common Height: 6’3″
Shortest: 5’9″ (Nate Rob)
Tallest: 6’7″ (Shaun Livingston)
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 191 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 175-180lbs
Lightest: 172lbs (Steve Blake)
Heaviest: 215 (Gilbert Arenas)
Range: 43lbs

Shooting Guards

Starters

Average Height: 6’5.25″
Most Common Height: 6’5″
Shortest: 6’2″ (Luke Ridnour)
Tallest: 6’8″ (Paul George, Gordon Hayward)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 209lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 210-215lbs
Lightest: 185lbs (Monta, KMart)
Heaviest: 240lbs (Joe Johnson)
Range: 55lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’4.5″
Most Common Height: 6’4″
Shortest: 6’1″ (Mo Williams)
Tallest: 6’8″ (Mike Miller)
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 203 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 200-205lbs
Lightest: 180lbs (Avery Bradley, JET)
Heaviest: 227lbs (Ronnie Brewer)
Range: 47lbs

Small Forwards

Starters

Average Height: 6’7.75″
Most Common Height: 6’7″/6’8″ (Tied)
Shortest: 6’6″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’10″ (Hedo, Gallo)
Range: 4″

Average Weight: 225lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Lightest: 205lbs (Dorell Wright)
Heaviest: 260lbs (Metta)
Range: 55lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’7.75″
Most Common Height: 6’6″
Shortest: 6’6″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’11″ (Austin Daye)
Range: 5″

Average Weight: 221lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Lightest: 188lbs (Corey Brewer)
Heaviest: 235lbs (Sasha Pavlovic)
Range: 47lbs

Power Forwards

Starters

Average Height: 6’9.5″
Most Common Height: 6’9″
Shortest: 6’7″ (Jason Maxiell, DeJuan Blair)
Tallest: 7’0″ (Dirk, Pau)
Range: 5″

Average Weight: 246lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-250lbs (240-245lbs/245-250lbs tied)
Lightest: 210lbs (Amir Johnson)
Heaviest: 275lbs (Kevin Seraphin)
Range: 65lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’9.25″
Most Common Height: 6’9″
Shortest: 6’8″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’11″ (Troy Murphy, Donte Greene)
Range: 3″

Average Weight: 237lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 230-240lbs (230-235lbs/235-240lbs tied)
Lightest: 210lbs (Brandan Wright)
Heaviest: 255lbs (Nick Collison)
Range:45lbs

Centers

Starters

Average Height: 6’11.25″
Most Common Height: 6’11″
Shortest: 6’9″ (Bismack, Joel Anthony)
Tallest: 7’2″ (Roy Hibbert
Range: 5″

Average Weight:257lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 250-255lbs
Lightest: 232lbs (Joakim Noah)
Heaviest: 290lbs (Pek)
Range:58lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’10.5″
Most Common Height: 7’0″
Shortest: 6’6″ (Chuck Hayes)
Tallest: 7’0″ (Several)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 251lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-245lbs
Lightest: 230lbs (Ian Mahinmi, Kurt Thomas)
Heaviest: 289lbs (Big Baby)
Range:59lbs

Wings

Starters

Average Height: 6’6.5″
Most Common Height: 6’7″
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 217lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Range: 85lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’6″
Most Common Height: 6’6″
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 212lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 200-205lbs
Range: 55

Bigs

Starters

Average Height: 6’10.5″
Most Common Height: 6’11″
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 251lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 250-255lbs
Range: 80lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’10″
Most Common Height: 6’9″/6’10″ (Tied)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 244lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-245lbs
Range: 79lbs

The results aren’t particularly surprising for the most part. The old 6’4″/6’6″/6’8″/6’10″/7’0″ rule of thumb for height by position works for most positions, with guards being the only group who are significantly shorter than those guidelines would suggest they should be. Guards also have the biggest variance in height, which would be expected given that there are usually a couple of 5’9″ types in the league at any time. With the group currently in the league, a new rule of thumb with the expectation at each position being an inch less than above would get you pretty close to reality, of not what is considered prototypical height.

The same goes for the weight results; PGs in the 190 range, SGs around 205 , SFs 225, PFs 240 and Cs 250. Backup’s at all positions but PG are around 5-10lbs lighter than the average starter, with the biggest gap coming at PF. The range between the lightest and heaviest at each position is around 50lbs (give or take 10) for all except the starting PF bunch too. This could be attributed to the fact that the PF position has a lot of flexibility, with low post bangers and sweet shooting 7 footers sharing the same title.

By the new school definition of positions, an average wing is between 6’6″ to 6’7″ and bigs somewhere between 6’10″ and 6’11″, which wouldn’t be far off expectation. Weight hovers around 215lbs for wings, with there being a wide and even spread of weight right from around 200 through to 230lbs. The weight variance between PFs and Cs isn’t as large as between SGs and SFs, so the weight results for the bigs largely mirror those for the individual positions – starters slightly taller and heavier than backups, but not greatly so.

 If we broadly define undersized and oversized (funny how we rarely hear that term used) as anything outside one standard deviation of the mean, that gives us approximately 1.5 inches either side of average for height (with a slightly narrower range for forwards than for guards or centers) and around 15lbs either side for weight. Taking this into account, this would be the range around average height and weight which should be considered, to me, normal.

PG: 6’0.5″ – 6’3.5″ / 175 – 205lbs
SG: 6’4″ – 6’7″ / 195 – 220lbs
SF: 6’6″ – 6’9″ /  210 – 240lbs
PF:  6’8″ – 6’11″ / 225 – 255lbs
C: 6’10″ – 7’1″ / 240lbs – 270lbs

The number of draftees I’ve seen labelled as undersized who fit within that range would be more than I can count on all my fingers and toes. Considering I’ve only followed the draft closely for five years (since 07) and have found it to be this prevalent, it’s starting to become a pet peeve of mine. Rather working off an old rule of thumb for prototypical size and labelling anyone an inch shorter or 10lbs lighter undersized, wouldn’t working off what is currently typical in the NBA provide a better basis for understanding how well a prospect will be able to translate his production and skills? I certainly think so and believe it would be fairer to college players entering the draft, for whom every inch can mean millions gained or lost.

In an exceptionally well written piece at Grantland, Steve Kerr makes six different points as to why the NBA should raise the age limit to 20. Two of those (Point 2: Financial costs, and Point 4: marketing) can be dismissed out of hand as cost-shifting from the NCAA/NBA to the players. Though Kerr’s right that Duncan and Ray Allen won’t miss the money at the end of their careers, the fact remains that the net effect here will be a transfer of some of the money that is paid in salary to NBA players back toward the NCAA.

It’s true that having the players spend more time in college helps general managers sort them, and also helps the league market them. However, this sorting and marketing process is already immensely profitable which is why the NCAA makes a ton of money. Just because it would make the NBA more profitable to have a higher hit rate on draft picks and have more visible draftees doesn’t mean it’s fair. It’s still cost-shifting, basically forcing the players to prove and market themselves for free while the NCAA profits from it. In any case, I don’t think even Kerr (or other higher age-limit supporters) believe this is the strongest argument. Let’s examine the other points about player development and making boys into men.

Comparing good to bad: a sure way to win an argument

The crux of the rest of the argument (and I’ll address player development later) is basically that college makes NBA players better human beings and better teammates. The primary evil here is AAU, or the AAU culture. I don’t think anybody would dispute that the influences placed on a young basketball player are conflicting and difficult to deal with. High school coaches just want to win games. AAU coaches want to win games and enhance their reputation. Top players have a hard time figuring out who they can actually trust, among advisors and friends alike.

In this sort of environment where everybody is promising something but also wants something in return, it takes a sort of hardness to survive. You can see this with a guy like Derrick Rose, who comes off very aloof and detached. Or Brandon Jennings who was forced to Italy due to low test scores, survived through little playing time and brutal coaching in Italy, and returned unfazed, with swag intact.

In the current environment, where a young prospective NBAer knows everybody will be trying to stick a hand in his pocket, who is a college coach except another sleezebag trying to profit off the kid’s gifts? College coaches certainly haven’t distinguished themselves with their moral rectitude recently. And it’s pretty hard to distinguish a college coach from a self-promoting jackass when they do stuff like this or this, which pretty much shows that they are interested in the players’ future to the extent that it aligns with their own competitive and personal interests. Some mentor that is. Real life lessons. Really going to reach those hardened kids and turn them into team players setting examples like that. The players who survive the mess of AAU have a cynicism about them that will allow them to rightly see that college is just another hoop, and a college coach is just another guy after his paycheck.

The reality is, the AAU system is screwing kids over and teaching them the wrong lessons about how to run their lives. The only ones who survive that chaotic and accountability-free underworld are the ones who look out for themselves. The only way to fix this is to tear it up by the roots and implement a cohesive system for top-level talent that starts at a young age. But by the time players reach college the die is probably already cast. Another year in the cloister isn’t going to excise the pernicious influences that gain a high schooler’s ear and take advantage of him when he makes the NBA. It’s merely delaying the inevitable.

Player development

The data here–that Michael Jordan at age 21 was better than LeBron James at age 19 is fairly easy to dismiss out of hand, since 21 year olds and 19 year olds are not the same. But let’s move beyond that and look at how little we ask of the NCAA as a player development mechanism. Here is an excerpt from my favorite article ever on sports player development:

The U.S. diverges all the way to the last stages of a player’s development. In other places around the world, the late teenage years are a kind of finishing school, a period when elite players grow into their bodies, sharpen their technical ability and gain a more sophisticated understanding of game tactics. At the same time, they are engaged in a fierce competition to rise through the ranks of their clubs and reach the first team (the equivalent of being promoted from a minor-league baseball team to the big-league club).

An elite American player of that age is still likely to be playing in college, which the rest of the soccer-playing world finds bizarre. He plays a short competitive season of three or four months. If he possesses anything approaching international-level talent, he probably has no peer on his team and rarely one on an opposing squad. He may not realize it at the time, but the game, in essence, is too easy for him.

The article is about soccer, but exactly the same thing could be said about basketball. NCAA basketball players are only involved in team practices between October and March, or about half the year. A team that does not go on a long tournament run will play less than 30 games in that stretch, and a good portion will be wasted dominating opponents so poor they teach future NBAers nothing about their strengths and weaknesses. If proponents of a higher age limit for the NBA want to use player development as an argument, the NCAA needs to get serious about optimizing its program for player development. Not for alumni who like to watch Kansas destroy Cupcake State on ESPN.

It’s true that the habit of having high school kids play more games than NBA players is detrimental to their development, as is the lack of a coherent vision at that level. But the NCAA fares little better at improving players, and if player development at the youth level is a problem it should be addressed there and not by raising the age limit. Another year in college will not fix the failure of the youth system to teach basic basketball skills. It just makes players older.

I believe Kerr’s piece is heartfelt, and it is certainly well thought out. That said, raising the age limit would do very little to address the problems he cites with player maturity and development. He has identified some very real problems with youth basketball in America. But a heavier dose of another disastrous and corrupt organization in the pipeline is in no way the answer.

Chad Buchanan seems like a nice and hard working guy. His opinion on the feasibility of picking up high level players, however, would indicate that he spends more time playing with the Trade Machine than working the phones. To wit:

Our draft picks are going to be available. If there’s a chance to get an established, proven player using a pick, we will definitely go that route.

In the course of the same interview, Buchanan mentioned the specific needs to be targeted were point guard and center. That sounds like it could be the Miami Heat: we’re pretty well set at 2-3-4, but we need a 1 and a 5. What Chad DIDN’T mention is that the Blazers actually only have two good players, and they are both forwards. That means in a 10 man rotation, the Blazers should be expecting to add about six more warm bodies (assuming Elliot Williams and Wesley Matthews are still here and Elliot gets to play).

The myth of Portland exceptionalism

Does Chad Buchanan have any idea how hard it is to acquire that many rotation-level players? The Lakers are trotting out Devin Ebanks and the rotting corpses of Metta World Peace and Steve Blake. The Wolves had to pay over four million a year for marginal rotation player JJ Barea. The Kings found nothing better to do with their capspace than pay Chuck Hayes, while the Rockets went with Samuel Dalambert. And of course our very own Blazers could find nothing better than Jamal Crawford for five million dollars a year.

How far is our capspace and two picks supposed to go in this kind of market? And why do we think we’ll do better than a team like the Pacers? The Pacers had tons of capspace and tons of desireable young talent next season. They chose to play it slow, partially because they are cheap, and that is the direction they headed, but also because turning capspace into a contender is incredibly difficult.

Of course though, the Blazers have an all-star. That seems to be a consistent theme of why the Blazers are in a great situation to sprint headlong forward and mortgage the future instead of smartly using the picks and building slowly. But how different does that make the Blazers? According to Kevin Pelton, 14 different teams had a player who was more productive than LaMarcus Aldridge this year. I doubt Minnesota or Utah is rushing to mortgage its future to take advantage of the primes of Kevin Love and Paul Millsap. In the case of Utah, we know that youth development remains the priority with a young cast of Derrick Favors, Gordon Hayward, Alec Burks and Enes Kanter.

Ultimately it seems the plan of an instant rebuild is based on a delusional view of just how difficult it is to pull off winning transactions in the NBA. A best-case scenario seems to involve a starting lineup of Dragic, Iguodala, Batum, Aldridge and Asik with Matthews off the bench. That’s the best-case scenario, basically hitting the best trade target, and the two best free agent fits. And that team still probably is in the bottom half of the West playoff bracket.

Beyond that, that team has virtually no depth, with a single frontcourt injury potentially being fatal. It also has basically traded all the picks in the near future, meaning the possibility of an infusion of upside before the end of Aldridge’s contract is basically nil. So even a best case scenario where the pick is traded for an all-star level player like Iguodala creates a team that is likely first round fodder, with little depth, and no obvious room for improvement. Chad Buchanan, you are smarter than to trade those picks.