This doesn’t deal with the possibility of a sign and trade, which I would be in favor of exploring but may involve too many moving parts to be feasible.

I have frequently been intensely critical of Nicolas Batum since his semi-breakout in the Spring of 2010. I don’t appreciate his willingness to get lost in the shuffle on offense despite his immense skills or the lapses in intensity or concentration on the defensive end. I also am skeptical of the argument that he’s been held back in his time in Portland by Nate McMillan’s rudimentary offense or poor guard play. Though those things will affect any player, there’s just not a lot of evidence that they are affecting Batum, whose impact on a game is more determined by his own level of interest than anything else.

That said, even as it stands Nicolas is a very good offensive player, both for his ability to knock down 3s at a high efficiency and high volume, and for his fluid athleticism which has helped him become better and better at finishing at the rim and getting to the line. His free throw rate has grown each year in the league, indicating even more potential for improvement in that area as he’s asked to take a greater load.

On the defensive end, Batum’s reputation as a stopper you can count on has waned after that initial impression was somewhat debunked by counterpart statistics, and observers began noting his inconsistent effort on that side of the ball. That said, he has yet to play for a coach that truly demands A+ effort from defenders. Put in the correct scheme with a strong motivator and I would expect him to be more consistent. Additionally his defensive counting stats are good. So factoring in blocks and steals Batum is probably at least an average defender despite the consistency problems.

Adding to his value, Batum plays a premium position. The conventional wisdom is that point guards and big men are more desirable than wings right now. That’s just not the case. This is verifiable by looking at something simple like PER, where Nic’s 17.3 mark makes him the 8th best small forward but there are 22 point guards with a better mark. Anecdotally it’s also easy to see that at least 1/2 the teams in the league need a good two-way wing, while probably less than five have an immediate need at the point guard position. So Nic’s skill-set is relatively rare and valuable. Just how valuable?

The slippery concept of value

Whenever Nicolas Batum’s contract comes up we usually get a list of comparables, which are players who play his position and are similarly productive: Andre Iguodala, Rudy Gay, Luol Deng, and Danilo Gallinari being the most common. Those guys have contracts that average between 10 and 15 million dollars a year. A preference for any of those guys over Batum is a pretty close call, and he is clearly superior to players on slightly less lucrative contracts ( Charlie Villanueva (5/37.7), Marvin Williams (5/37.5), Andray Blatche (5/35.7) and Trevor Ariza (5/34) Wilson Chander, (5/35)).

It is tempting to call all of these players overpaid. But really the fact of the matter is non-rookie players are just overpaid on aggregate. So these numbers start to look kind of gnarly. But that’s going to be the case for every non-rookie or non-superstar max level contract, unless the player makes massive improvements over the course of the deal like LaMarcus Aldridge did. So teams should value their draft picks, but also have to recognize that to put together a basketball team you have to play in the “overpaid” pool of non-rookies and non-superstars.

More Seagull than Albatross

Educated observers are wise to note the importance of not overspending on role players (or even stars) as this can hamstring a team’s flexibility and force an owner to spend through the nose for an overly expensive team. That said, I don’t really see Batum’s contract becoming an albatross. He is young, the new limits on offer sheets will help, and it’s hard to think of a reasonable scenario where even a 12 million dollar contract will hamstring the Blazers. Even if the Blazers do happen upon superstars in the draft, Batum is essentially a Cadillac role player who would snap in beautifully next to a few budding stars.

As Kevin Pelton points out, it’s not the rate of extensions that kill teams, it’s the length. It is very hard to project how good a player will be in 5 years. Two of the most infamous contracts of the last CBA were Rashard Lewis and Gilbert Arenas, who basically became non-contributors in the last two years of massive contracts. Pelton’s study points out that production is generally a fairly decent value for the first three years, then tends to drop off a cliff. As such, in matching a big offer sheet for Batum, the Blazers will be taking a calculated gamble on a year of dead weight on the end of the contract. That’s a much better bet than a 5 or 6 year contract, where 40-50% of the contract is so far out it is difficult to project.

Further mitigating the risk is Batum’s age. Many of the players who become dead weight toward the end of their contract are signing their third or fourth contracts. That means the teams are just incorrectly pricing the decline of aging players. Even if Batum has stopped developing, he’s unlikely to decline during the years that generally constitute the first part of a player’s prime. So even under a fairly spendy extension, I’d say it’s fairly likely he will continue producing at a high level such that he remains in the echelon of other players earning similar money.

The next issue is the argument for flexibility necessarily requires a plausible alternative for the cap space Batum is about to occupy. Currently, the Blazers have just $31 million under contract next year. That means even after signing Batum to a $12 million dollar contract they would still have nearly enough money to throw at a maximum dollar free agent.

It is hard to imagine what Portland is going to do with all that money that is a more efficient use of it than signing Nic. Taking on a player like Andre Iguodala is somewhat better than Batum, but also carries a larger price tag and would require giving up an additional asset. He would also need a contract extension after next season (assuming he opts out) which would require a long-term commitment locking Portland into the tail end of his prime. Other free agents would also likely be coming off their second contract, and also at a greater risk than Batum to tail off during the extension. When we look at the free-agent pool and possibly available trades, there aren’t too many that avoid this trap (and there aren’t even that many good players in the free agent pool this summer).

Another possibility is simply to sign a series of bloated one-year contracts and continue rolling over the cap flexibility. But in the real world, players of Batum’s caliber or better rarely move in free agency or through trades for nothing more than capspace. To the extent that they do, they are either perceived to be damaged goods (Zach Randolph) or too old and expensive to justify the money (Carlos Boozer). I am all for gambling on the next Zach Randolph, but doesn’t holding over $25 million in capspace seem a bit excessive? Basically we’d be doing “rent-a-team” for four years in hopes of getting two Zach Randolphs!

Serendipity

The other issue alluded to above is that a long “albatross” of a contract can interfere with a team as it tries to change directions. The Sixers, for example, are somewhat hamstrung by Elton Brand’s bloated extension, while the Blazers were very fortunate to have the amnesty provision which keeps Brandon Roy’s deal from being an obstacle. But based on his youth, the relatively short-term nature of any impending offer sheet, and his qualities as a player, Batum is far more likely to be an asset on the court rather than a toxic bit of the ledger.

One of the recent columns of my latest writing spree related to why it’s good to stay decent instead of totally bottoming out. In that piece I outlined why I belive it’s easier to retain as many good players as possible, then be prepared to be a contender should you luck into a championship piece. Batum is a perfect guy to keep around in this sort of strategy. Should the Blazers hit the jackpot on the trade market or with the ping-pong balls, Batum will be a perfect complementary piece to stick alongside any star player.

To the extent that he will overpaid to be a complementary player, I can offer two responses. First, quality complementary two way wings are very rare as discussed above. Second, is it better to handsomely pay an excellent complementary player who can work with a ball-dominant star, or pay a guy who is a below-average “star” type like Rudy Gay who needs the ball to be effective but may not be good enough to be a first or second option on a team that wins anything? The answer for me isn’t clear but I would lean toward paying the complementary guy who defends and shoots. The star’s value will diminish if the team ever manages to make the moves necessary to win, while the complementary player’s value will increase.

By way of conclusion, I understand this isn’t a particularly strong or affirmative case for Batum being worth $12 million dollars. But the market for non-rookies and non-superstars is bloated not by the stupidity of NBA teams but by the rules of the CBA. So he will garner an eight-figure offer. Criticism of the market rate has to be accompanied with something more than blanket hand-waiving about him making too much (of course he makes too much, he’s a pro athlete!). It has to be shown that the market provides other and better options.

Size is a subject of much scrutiny in the NBA. It seems to be something you just have or you don’t (or in some cases, you have too much of) and once you’re labelled as small, short or overweight, it’s hard to shake. Generally size refers just to a players height and weight, with other concepts such as length and athleticism often given near equal importance but defined using different parameters. One area in which size is considered particularly important is in the draft, as a tool to help understand which draft prospects can translate their college production to the NBA .

Having size is of such great importance to college players looking to enter the NBA because having above average or even just so-called prototypical size for your likely NBA position will often lead to concerns over production, character and skill being ignored or at least somewhat overlooked. On the flip side, being an undersized prospect often-times means that production slips into the background, mired in questions of whether what was done on-court in college will be translatable.

I love analysing the draft and am obsessed with the skill, production and physical tools nexus that forms the basis of a player’s standing as a prospect. As a result I thought I’d investigate what prototypical size in the NBA really is by breaking down average height and weight by position, what was most common and what range existed. I originally did this just to have my own reference for this and future drafts but I thought I’d share, for anyone who shares my particular fascination.

I looked at the primary starter and backup across all NBA teams and broke down what I found both in basketball’s traditional five positions and by the growingly popular points, wings and bigs definition. I took injuries into account as well, for example using Varejao as Cleveland’s starting C rather than another player who stepped in to fill the gap. As a result there is some subjectivity to the players included but in reality it just avoided having temporary, out-of-position fill ins included over the usual starters. I used 82games’ production by position charts to decide on the location of any player who could be considered positionally ambiguous.

Point Guards

Starters

Average Height: 6’2″
Most Common Height: 6’3″
Shortest: 5’9″ (Isaiah Thomas)
Tallest: 6’4″ (Several)
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 189 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 180-185lbs
Lightest: 160lbs (Darren Collison)
Heaviest: ∞ (Raymond Felton)
Range: 51lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’2.25″
Most Common Height: 6’3″
Shortest: 5’9″ (Nate Rob)
Tallest: 6’7″ (Shaun Livingston)
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 191 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 175-180lbs
Lightest: 172lbs (Steve Blake)
Heaviest: 215 (Gilbert Arenas)
Range: 43lbs

Shooting Guards

Starters

Average Height: 6’5.25″
Most Common Height: 6’5″
Shortest: 6’2″ (Luke Ridnour)
Tallest: 6’8″ (Paul George, Gordon Hayward)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 209lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 210-215lbs
Lightest: 185lbs (Monta, KMart)
Heaviest: 240lbs (Joe Johnson)
Range: 55lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’4.5″
Most Common Height: 6’4″
Shortest: 6’1″ (Mo Williams)
Tallest: 6’8″ (Mike Miller)
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 203 lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 200-205lbs
Lightest: 180lbs (Avery Bradley, JET)
Heaviest: 227lbs (Ronnie Brewer)
Range: 47lbs

Small Forwards

Starters

Average Height: 6’7.75″
Most Common Height: 6’7″/6’8″ (Tied)
Shortest: 6’6″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’10″ (Hedo, Gallo)
Range: 4″

Average Weight: 225lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Lightest: 205lbs (Dorell Wright)
Heaviest: 260lbs (Metta)
Range: 55lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’7.75″
Most Common Height: 6’6″
Shortest: 6’6″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’11″ (Austin Daye)
Range: 5″

Average Weight: 221lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Lightest: 188lbs (Corey Brewer)
Heaviest: 235lbs (Sasha Pavlovic)
Range: 47lbs

Power Forwards

Starters

Average Height: 6’9.5″
Most Common Height: 6’9″
Shortest: 6’7″ (Jason Maxiell, DeJuan Blair)
Tallest: 7’0″ (Dirk, Pau)
Range: 5″

Average Weight: 246lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-250lbs (240-245lbs/245-250lbs tied)
Lightest: 210lbs (Amir Johnson)
Heaviest: 275lbs (Kevin Seraphin)
Range: 65lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’9.25″
Most Common Height: 6’9″
Shortest: 6’8″ (Several)
Tallest: 6’11″ (Troy Murphy, Donte Greene)
Range: 3″

Average Weight: 237lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 230-240lbs (230-235lbs/235-240lbs tied)
Lightest: 210lbs (Brandan Wright)
Heaviest: 255lbs (Nick Collison)
Range:45lbs

Centers

Starters

Average Height: 6’11.25″
Most Common Height: 6’11″
Shortest: 6’9″ (Bismack, Joel Anthony)
Tallest: 7’2″ (Roy Hibbert
Range: 5″

Average Weight:257lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 250-255lbs
Lightest: 232lbs (Joakim Noah)
Heaviest: 290lbs (Pek)
Range:58lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’10.5″
Most Common Height: 7’0″
Shortest: 6’6″ (Chuck Hayes)
Tallest: 7’0″ (Several)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 251lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-245lbs
Lightest: 230lbs (Ian Mahinmi, Kurt Thomas)
Heaviest: 289lbs (Big Baby)
Range:59lbs

Wings

Starters

Average Height: 6’6.5″
Most Common Height: 6’7″
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 217lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 225-230lbs
Range: 85lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’6″
Most Common Height: 6’6″
Range: 10″

Average Weight: 212lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 200-205lbs
Range: 55

Bigs

Starters

Average Height: 6’10.5″
Most Common Height: 6’11″
Range: 7″

Average Weight: 251lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 250-255lbs
Range: 80lbs

Backups

Average Height: 6’10″
Most Common Height: 6’9″/6’10″ (Tied)
Range: 6″

Average Weight: 244lbs
Most Common Weight Range: 240-245lbs
Range: 79lbs

The results aren’t particularly surprising for the most part. The old 6’4″/6’6″/6’8″/6’10″/7’0″ rule of thumb for height by position works for most positions, with guards being the only group who are significantly shorter than those guidelines would suggest they should be. Guards also have the biggest variance in height, which would be expected given that there are usually a couple of 5’9″ types in the league at any time. With the group currently in the league, a new rule of thumb with the expectation at each position being an inch less than above would get you pretty close to reality, of not what is considered prototypical height.

The same goes for the weight results; PGs in the 190 range, SGs around 205 , SFs 225, PFs 240 and Cs 250. Backup’s at all positions but PG are around 5-10lbs lighter than the average starter, with the biggest gap coming at PF. The range between the lightest and heaviest at each position is around 50lbs (give or take 10) for all except the starting PF bunch too. This could be attributed to the fact that the PF position has a lot of flexibility, with low post bangers and sweet shooting 7 footers sharing the same title.

By the new school definition of positions, an average wing is between 6’6″ to 6’7″ and bigs somewhere between 6’10″ and 6’11″, which wouldn’t be far off expectation. Weight hovers around 215lbs for wings, with there being a wide and even spread of weight right from around 200 through to 230lbs. The weight variance between PFs and Cs isn’t as large as between SGs and SFs, so the weight results for the bigs largely mirror those for the individual positions – starters slightly taller and heavier than backups, but not greatly so.

 If we broadly define undersized and oversized (funny how we rarely hear that term used) as anything outside one standard deviation of the mean, that gives us approximately 1.5 inches either side of average for height (with a slightly narrower range for forwards than for guards or centers) and around 15lbs either side for weight. Taking this into account, this would be the range around average height and weight which should be considered, to me, normal.

PG: 6’0.5″ – 6’3.5″ / 175 – 205lbs
SG: 6’4″ – 6’7″ / 195 – 220lbs
SF: 6’6″ – 6’9″ /  210 – 240lbs
PF:  6’8″ – 6’11″ / 225 – 255lbs
C: 6’10″ – 7’1″ / 240lbs – 270lbs

The number of draftees I’ve seen labelled as undersized who fit within that range would be more than I can count on all my fingers and toes. Considering I’ve only followed the draft closely for five years (since 07) and have found it to be this prevalent, it’s starting to become a pet peeve of mine. Rather working off an old rule of thumb for prototypical size and labelling anyone an inch shorter or 10lbs lighter undersized, wouldn’t working off what is currently typical in the NBA provide a better basis for understanding how well a prospect will be able to translate his production and skills? I certainly think so and believe it would be fairer to college players entering the draft, for whom every inch can mean millions gained or lost.

In an exceptionally well written piece at Grantland, Steve Kerr makes six different points as to why the NBA should raise the age limit to 20. Two of those (Point 2: Financial costs, and Point 4: marketing) can be dismissed out of hand as cost-shifting from the NCAA/NBA to the players. Though Kerr’s right that Duncan and Ray Allen won’t miss the money at the end of their careers, the fact remains that the net effect here will be a transfer of some of the money that is paid in salary to NBA players back toward the NCAA.

It’s true that having the players spend more time in college helps general managers sort them, and also helps the league market them. However, this sorting and marketing process is already immensely profitable which is why the NCAA makes a ton of money. Just because it would make the NBA more profitable to have a higher hit rate on draft picks and have more visible draftees doesn’t mean it’s fair. It’s still cost-shifting, basically forcing the players to prove and market themselves for free while the NCAA profits from it. In any case, I don’t think even Kerr (or other higher age-limit supporters) believe this is the strongest argument. Let’s examine the other points about player development and making boys into men.

Comparing good to bad: a sure way to win an argument

The crux of the rest of the argument (and I’ll address player development later) is basically that college makes NBA players better human beings and better teammates. The primary evil here is AAU, or the AAU culture. I don’t think anybody would dispute that the influences placed on a young basketball player are conflicting and difficult to deal with. High school coaches just want to win games. AAU coaches want to win games and enhance their reputation. Top players have a hard time figuring out who they can actually trust, among advisors and friends alike.

In this sort of environment where everybody is promising something but also wants something in return, it takes a sort of hardness to survive. You can see this with a guy like Derrick Rose, who comes off very aloof and detached. Or Brandon Jennings who was forced to Italy due to low test scores, survived through little playing time and brutal coaching in Italy, and returned unfazed, with swag intact.

In the current environment, where a young prospective NBAer knows everybody will be trying to stick a hand in his pocket, who is a college coach except another sleezebag trying to profit off the kid’s gifts? College coaches certainly haven’t distinguished themselves with their moral rectitude recently. And it’s pretty hard to distinguish a college coach from a self-promoting jackass when they do stuff like this or this, which pretty much shows that they are interested in the players’ future to the extent that it aligns with their own competitive and personal interests. Some mentor that is. Real life lessons. Really going to reach those hardened kids and turn them into team players setting examples like that. The players who survive the mess of AAU have a cynicism about them that will allow them to rightly see that college is just another hoop, and a college coach is just another guy after his paycheck.

The reality is, the AAU system is screwing kids over and teaching them the wrong lessons about how to run their lives. The only ones who survive that chaotic and accountability-free underworld are the ones who look out for themselves. The only way to fix this is to tear it up by the roots and implement a cohesive system for top-level talent that starts at a young age. But by the time players reach college the die is probably already cast. Another year in the cloister isn’t going to excise the pernicious influences that gain a high schooler’s ear and take advantage of him when he makes the NBA. It’s merely delaying the inevitable.

Player development

The data here–that Michael Jordan at age 21 was better than LeBron James at age 19 is fairly easy to dismiss out of hand, since 21 year olds and 19 year olds are not the same. But let’s move beyond that and look at how little we ask of the NCAA as a player development mechanism. Here is an excerpt from my favorite article ever on sports player development:

The U.S. diverges all the way to the last stages of a player’s development. In other places around the world, the late teenage years are a kind of finishing school, a period when elite players grow into their bodies, sharpen their technical ability and gain a more sophisticated understanding of game tactics. At the same time, they are engaged in a fierce competition to rise through the ranks of their clubs and reach the first team (the equivalent of being promoted from a minor-league baseball team to the big-league club).

An elite American player of that age is still likely to be playing in college, which the rest of the soccer-playing world finds bizarre. He plays a short competitive season of three or four months. If he possesses anything approaching international-level talent, he probably has no peer on his team and rarely one on an opposing squad. He may not realize it at the time, but the game, in essence, is too easy for him.

The article is about soccer, but exactly the same thing could be said about basketball. NCAA basketball players are only involved in team practices between October and March, or about half the year. A team that does not go on a long tournament run will play less than 30 games in that stretch, and a good portion will be wasted dominating opponents so poor they teach future NBAers nothing about their strengths and weaknesses. If proponents of a higher age limit for the NBA want to use player development as an argument, the NCAA needs to get serious about optimizing its program for player development. Not for alumni who like to watch Kansas destroy Cupcake State on ESPN.

It’s true that the habit of having high school kids play more games than NBA players is detrimental to their development, as is the lack of a coherent vision at that level. But the NCAA fares little better at improving players, and if player development at the youth level is a problem it should be addressed there and not by raising the age limit. Another year in college will not fix the failure of the youth system to teach basic basketball skills. It just makes players older.

I believe Kerr’s piece is heartfelt, and it is certainly well thought out. That said, raising the age limit would do very little to address the problems he cites with player maturity and development. He has identified some very real problems with youth basketball in America. But a heavier dose of another disastrous and corrupt organization in the pipeline is in no way the answer.

Chad Buchanan seems like a nice and hard working guy. His opinion on the feasibility of picking up high level players, however, would indicate that he spends more time playing with the Trade Machine than working the phones. To wit:

Our draft picks are going to be available. If there’s a chance to get an established, proven player using a pick, we will definitely go that route.

In the course of the same interview, Buchanan mentioned the specific needs to be targeted were point guard and center. That sounds like it could be the Miami Heat: we’re pretty well set at 2-3-4, but we need a 1 and a 5. What Chad DIDN’T mention is that the Blazers actually only have two good players, and they are both forwards. That means in a 10 man rotation, the Blazers should be expecting to add about six more warm bodies (assuming Elliot Williams and Wesley Matthews are still here and Elliot gets to play).

The myth of Portland exceptionalism

Does Chad Buchanan have any idea how hard it is to acquire that many rotation-level players? The Lakers are trotting out Devin Ebanks and the rotting corpses of Metta World Peace and Steve Blake. The Wolves had to pay over four million a year for marginal rotation player JJ Barea. The Kings found nothing better to do with their capspace than pay Chuck Hayes, while the Rockets went with Samuel Dalambert. And of course our very own Blazers could find nothing better than Jamal Crawford for five million dollars a year.

How far is our capspace and two picks supposed to go in this kind of market? And why do we think we’ll do better than a team like the Pacers? The Pacers had tons of capspace and tons of desireable young talent next season. They chose to play it slow, partially because they are cheap, and that is the direction they headed, but also because turning capspace into a contender is incredibly difficult.

Of course though, the Blazers have an all-star. That seems to be a consistent theme of why the Blazers are in a great situation to sprint headlong forward and mortgage the future instead of smartly using the picks and building slowly. But how different does that make the Blazers? According to Kevin Pelton, 14 different teams had a player who was more productive than LaMarcus Aldridge this year. I doubt Minnesota or Utah is rushing to mortgage its future to take advantage of the primes of Kevin Love and Paul Millsap. In the case of Utah, we know that youth development remains the priority with a young cast of Derrick Favors, Gordon Hayward, Alec Burks and Enes Kanter.

Ultimately it seems the plan of an instant rebuild is based on a delusional view of just how difficult it is to pull off winning transactions in the NBA. A best-case scenario seems to involve a starting lineup of Dragic, Iguodala, Batum, Aldridge and Asik with Matthews off the bench. That’s the best-case scenario, basically hitting the best trade target, and the two best free agent fits. And that team still probably is in the bottom half of the West playoff bracket.

Beyond that, that team has virtually no depth, with a single frontcourt injury potentially being fatal. It also has basically traded all the picks in the near future, meaning the possibility of an infusion of upside before the end of Aldridge’s contract is basically nil. So even a best case scenario where the pick is traded for an all-star level player like Iguodala creates a team that is likely first round fodder, with little depth, and no obvious room for improvement. Chad Buchanan, you are smarter than to trade those picks.

The max contract superstar is one of the most powerful tools for building a championship team in the NBA. It allows a team to lock up a marquee player at a fraction of his actual worth. Deron Williams is a superstar, and this season he will expect a call from nearly every team that can offer a max contract, along with the incumbent Brooklyn Nets. He’s also 27 years old, so on the right end of the prime of his career. And he plays a position the Blazers have not been able to stabilize since Terry Porter. Nonetheless I would not sign him to a max contract. Here’s why.

The max contract is only valuable for a super max player

As Nate Silver points out, the only two ways to achieve success in the NBA are to either use your cap dollars efficiently or find a way to exceed the cap. In the case of LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, Dwight Howard, Chris Paul and Kevin Durant the max contract is a no-brainer way to use cap dollars efficiently. In the case of second-tier “stars” the case is far less clear.

While evaluating team performance by simply aggregating Hollinger’s EWA (basically PER*minutes) like Silver does in his piece needs to be done with extreme caution, both EWA and WARP (Kevin Pelton’s statistic) do give some indication of how much a team is getting for its money. In both systems, Deron Williams has been worth between 10 and 13 wins a year over the past four seasons. That’s been good for a ranking anywhere between 17th and 26th in the NBA. So while not an all-NBA talent, Williams is an excellent player.

From the money perspective, a max contract beginning this year would start around 16 million dollars and escalate to over 20 million after three years. Williams would then be taking up between 1/4 and 1/3 of the team’s cap space over the course of the contract. Buying 13 wins for 1/3 of the cap space is not a horrible deal from a purely economic standpoint. If a team spends at exactly that efficiency level it can buy another 26 wins with the rest of that cap space, add those to the 11 wins a replacement team would win and is about a 50 win team. (The reason these calculations are estimated is because I don’t want to give the false gravitas of decimals where they are all pure estimations anyway. The anergies and synergies of team play, along with the lack of precision in translating WARP or EWA to team win makes any sort of precision foolhardy).

A 50 win team without flexibility

A team that signs Deron Williams takes on the burden of attempting to contend immediately. He has been anointed a superstar, having led Utah to multiple 50 win seasons and several playoff series victories. There, the narrative goes, management was unable to build a championship team around him. In a similar vein to the arguments about Anthony, however, how strong does a supporting cast have to be before we start questioning the stariness of the star?

Williams only led the Jazz in PER one season (when injuries relegated Carlos Boozer to 37 games). He was surrounded by Boozer, deadeye center Mehmet Okur, all-defensive and all around terror Andrei Kirilenko, deadeye marksman Kyle Korver, the underrated and productive Ronnie Brewer and later Paul Millsap. That’s not exactly what the Magic have around Dwight or what LeBron left in Cleveland, it’s an excellent and versatile cast of role players.

If the Blazers put in a call to Deron Williams, do they really believe they could assemble that kind of supporting cast? AK47 looks a lot like Batum’s very best case, while Aldridge is better than Boozer it doesn’t really make up for the overall strength, depth and fit of the rest of that team. So basically as a best case, the team would be telling its players and fans that it was building toward a championship when in reality, it was really paving a path to the second round.

The expectations game

My last post was indeed a defense of this sort of existence. However, that only makes sense to the extent that the team maintains the flexibility to take the next step. Signing Williams basically puts the team in the second round with no path out. As part of the sales pitch to Williams, a commitment will be made to winning immediately. Additionally, because of the perception that he is a superstar, the efforts to build through the draft will cease, and the team will probably put its stock in overrated and underperforming old guys to fill out the rotation.

The team would probably be over the cap, and use the mid-level exception each year to sign a player who would likely turn out to be a sub-par value over the course of his contract. And any and all draft picks would be traded, sacrificing upside at the altar of immediate improvement. Chad Buchanan has already shown a worrisome propensity for this. The Blazers would be left with an expensive and inflexible roster, fretting about how to make a “superstar” happy when it’s not even clear he was ever the best player on a playoff team.

Compared to this situation, I would prefer to be the Nuggets, Rockets, Jazz, or Pacers. In each case, the team has a variety of tradeable assets and is armed for a move that will truly put them over the top. Whichever team signs Deron Williams will likely just be churning stopgaps while people wonder why such a “great” player’s prime is being wasted.

In the extensive discussions regarding tanking and the health of the NBA, Daryl Morey’s Houston Rockets are consistently held up as a paragon of virtue. Each year, the Rockets compete at the fringes of the playoff picture and end up with a mid-first round pick. Each year they also smartly leverage their available assets and an uncanny ability to find quality players with second round picks or off the scrap heap. But the context of these references is always distinctly patronizing tone. The narrative is that poor Daryl basically isn’t giving himself the best chance to win a championship, and atrocious teams who receive better lottery picks such as the Bobcats and Wizards are actually closer to championship contention under the “get good to get bad” principle.

The Principle

 On first glance, the idea that getting bad to get good is the only way to contend has some merit. It’s incredibly hard to win a championship in the NBA without a top-10 player in the league. That’s both because of the max salary resulting in the very best players being underpaid, and the structure of the game of basketball which allows a single player to dominate the game to a much greater extent than in any other sport (only five players on the court, the best player can get the ball at basically any time).

Not only is getting a star player crucial, it’s also the most difficult thing for an NBA team to do. For small markets obviously the only option is to either attempt to draft one and build a great team convincing him to stay. Even in the case of large markets which can attract stars who want to play there, however, it’s easy to think they got a superstar when they actually did not.

Since getting a superstar is the single hardest step on the road to building a contender, there is a temptation to say it is a good idea to completely sell out and do everything possible to get one. That means the Bobcats, who have a 25% chance at superstar-in-waiting Anthony Davis, are in better shape than the Rockets who have a minimal shot at a franchise-level player in this year’s draft. After the Bobcats win the lottery and draft Davis, they will win the lottery again and get Shabazz Mohammed. Then they will start actually making smart personnel decisions, fill out their roster with young role players, and win it all. Or that’s the “get bad to get good” theory.

A failure to understand math

While it’s true that acquiring a superstar is by far the hardest single part of building a contending roster, it’s part of an incredibly long and difficult journey to pull a franchise from putridity to contention. In addition to acquiring a superstar or two, a team has to fill out the rest of the roster with cost-effective role players who fit the team concept, and hire a coach who can develop players and get them to play defense. This might require 10-15 independent transactions to get just the right mixture.

While none of these transactions is independently nearly as improbable as getting a Davis-level player, each offers an independent opportunity for bad luck or just plain stupidity.  It’s impossible to say exactly how many transactions it takes to build a great supporting cast for a variety of reasons, or what your odds of screwing it up are. But even if a personnel manager has to make just five discrete decisions with a 60% rate of success, the rate of failing at that is 93%. Even just the possibility of success for the first part of Charlotte’s plan (getting Davis and Muhammed) is around 11%.

The issue here is people generally fail to understand serialized probabilities for independent events. They look at the Packers, see they are favored in every single game, and don’t understand how unlikely it is to win eight in a row. Similarly, they fail to see how difficult it is to do what Oklahoma City did, or what Charlotte is trying to do. Part of that difficulty is the luck involved in getting a superstar or two. But another part is recognizing the value of James Harden over Jeff Green, seeing how useful Nick Collison is, and finding role players like Serge Ibaka in the late-first round.

Compounding the math misunderstanding is the desire to round “very small” to “zero.” Houston (or Denver, or Indiana) is extremely unlikely to get a superstar this year. That’s not the same as having no chance though. Houston has about five chances in a thousand at Davis. Houston also nearly bagged a superstar in Pau Gasol over the summer. Sometimes the right team can find an undervalued star like Zach Randolph by getting the timing right (though whether he fits the “superstar” description is somewhat up in the air).

And for all the chatter about how Morey has been like Sisyphus in his eternal quest for a superstar, it’s only been three years since Yao and T-Mac went down. So let’s give it a few years before we declare the middle of the NBA some sort of awful purgatory. Remember, purgatory lasts forever. Just because there is no obvious way out doesn’t mean there is no way out forever.

Being ready to be lucky

NBA history bears out the idea that most championship winners were the ones who were sort of middling along, then managed to add a superstar piece through either an extremely lucky occurrence (Pau Gasol, Tim Duncan) or by exploiting a market inefficiency (Kobe Bryant). When you add in the fact that even being a middling playoff team is fun, there’s no doubt I’m much happier with what’s happening with the Nuggets or Rockets than the Bobcats. I think the teams in the bottom half of the playoff bracket are far closer to winning it all. All they require is a single stroke of brilliance, luck, or serendipity where the Bobcats and Kings require a slew of semi-probable events.

That said, this argument is somewhat of a strawman. No team in the middle of the league with cost-effective young players has ever simply decided they would be better off getting really bad really fast. Teams that end up in the Bobcats’ situation do so because their middling core became untenable, based on both financial and age constraints. The idea that teams willingly go from the middle of the league to the bottom of the league to get closer to a championship is both wrong in assuming it occurs, and wrong in assuming it would help a team win it all.

Team Records: Portland (28-37) at Utah (35-30)

Game Info: 5 PM-TV on CSNNW, Radio on 750 AM the Game.

Vegas Line: Utah -6

Refs: Greg Willard, Mark Ayotte, Violet Palmer.

The Skinny: Blazer fans have been looking forward to this day for a long time, a day in which we can finally bid this team that started so well than crashed and burned so badly goodbye for good.  The Blazers close out the season in Utah against a Jazz team that will be the #8 seed in the west playoffs after beating Phoenix Monday. 

Last Time They Met: The Blazers laid an egg on fan appreciation night, falling handily to Utah and losing by 21 in a game that wasn’t that close. 

Projected Jazz Lineup:

PF-Paul Millsap (Louisiana Tech-6^th Season) 16.6 PPG, 8.7 RPG, 2.3 APG.

SF-Demarre Carroll (Missouri-3^rd Season)-4.4 PPG, 2.1 RPG, .7 APG.

C-Al Jefferson (Prentiss (HS)-8^th Season)-19.6 PPG, 9.6 RPG, 2.2 APG

SG-Gordon Hayward (Butler-2^nd Season)-11.8 PPG, 3.6 RPG, 3.2 APG.

PG-Devin Harris (Wisconsin-8^th Season)-11 PPG, 1.7 RPG, 5.1 APG.

Image Courtesy of zimbio.com

Player to Watch-Al Jefferson (pictured at right)-It was a long time to go between playoff appearances for Jefferson, making the playoffs as a rookie with Boston seven years ago to making the playoffs with Utah now.  In between Jefferson got a reputation as a player who put up stats but didn’t necessarily help your team win.  Jefferson is devastatingly effective on the left block, but only the left block, and has had his best offensive season of his career this year.  He rarely turns the ball over and is a good rebounder for his position.  On defense, he is questionable at best but if part of an otherwise strong defensive lineup, he can be hidden pretty well.  Jefferson is clearly a key reason Utah has made the playoffs this year.

Did You Know?: The Utah Jazz have only missed the playoffs four times since the 1983-84 season and have only had a losing record once during that span.

Song of the Day: “Time of Your Life” by Green Day-To conclude this season we have to go with one of my favorite songs of all time.  I hope next season we indeed have the time of our lives and can put this year behind us quickly.  Enjoy:

Injury Updates:

Portland: Out-SG Elliott Williams (Shoulder), PF Shawne Williams (Foot), PF LaMarcus Aldridge (Hip), Questionable-SF Nicolas Batum (Quad), C-Joel Przybilla (Bronchitis), SG Jamal Crawford (Ankle).

Utah: Out-PG Earl Watson (Knee), SG CJ Miles (Gastroc Muscle Strain).

Re-Evaluating Utah: A Playoff Surprise

The Jazz were not supposed to be this good this quickly  They were a young team with a  new coach, a point guard who didn’t want to be there and a player in Al Jefferson known more for putting up big stats than winning games.  Yet they made it all work this year because of a combination of strong defense, a big step up from several players, most notably Gordon Hayward and even a little bit of luck.  Its doubtful they’ll make much noise in the postseason and, in fact making the playoffs cost them their draft pick.  Still it is hard not to be excited for this new generation of Utah players as they make the first of what should be many playoff runs.

The Bottom Line:

Portland wins if: They make Utah rely on isos on offense.  The key to Utah’s offense, especially Millsap’s, is passing.  If Portland can force Utah to beat them 1 on 1, they will probably be able to walk out with a win.